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Falkland Islands landmine exploitation - March 2015

FALKLAND ISLANDS LANDMINE EXPLOITATION – MARCH 2015
This report and the associated exploitation work was funded by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland.
Background
The need for exploitation1 was recognised early during the planning for mine clearance operations in the
Falkland Islands. Little was known about the state of the mines some 30 years after the conflict, and it was
considered important to understand the effects of ageing, along with the implications for issues such as
appearance/recognition, functionality and detectability.
Exploitation was previously carried out during clearance Phases 1 and 3. This report outlines the work
conducted during Phase 4a, where samples of the following mines were examined:
Type
Anti-personnel (AP)
Anti-tank (AT)

Designation

Country of origin

Number examined/tested

P4B

Spain

50

SB-33

Italy

16

SB-81

Italy

12

Outline details of these mines are given in Annex A.
A total of 78 mines and fuzes were examined or tested, with 38 mines being fully disassembled. Work was
carried out by Colin King (herinafter ‘CK’), technical director of Fenix Insight Ltd, from 5 – 12 March 2015.
Aim
The aim of this report is to outline the findings from the exploitation work, with particular emphasis on:
a. The general condition of the mines
b. Their ability to function, either as designed, or by other mechanisms
c. Significant changes in their characteristics that might affect detectability or sensitivity.
Preparation
Tools were fabricated in the UK to allow the machine-assembled casings of the SB-33 and SB-81 mines to
be opened without inflicting unnecessary damage. A number of other specialist tools were taken to the
Falklands, while others were bought or borrowed locally.
The process was mapped (see Annex B) and risk assessments were performed for the disassembly of each
mine type; appropriate controls were emplaced for activities considered particularly hazardous.
Recovery of Mines
AP mines were recovered by BACTEC the Land Release Contractor (LRC) during clearance operations. P4B
mines were defuzed and stored, ready for exploitation, in the holding area.
Defuzing SB-33 mines was considered potentially hazardous, since the detonator is extracted perpendicular
to the firing pin; this means that the mine could function if the pin were embedded in the detonator – a

1

The process of disassembling explosive ordnance in order to accurately characterise the munition.
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situation that was later found to have occurred. SB-33 mines were therefore recovered and stored fully
fuzed.
AT mines were located, identified and partially uncovered by the deminers, but left in place. CK
photographed each mine in position before fully uncovering and lifting. The mines were then assessed to
establish that it was safe to disarm them, and were defuzed inside the minefield.

SB-81 mines were located and partially exposed by AT mines were examined and then defuzed in the
minefield. The condition of detonators was noted
deminers, then recovered by CK

Disassembly and examination
Exploitation was carried out in a remote area of the quarry at Pony Pass, adjacent to the site used for the
destruction of mines by burning. Access to the area was controlled to minimise the risk during the
disassembly process.

The APB was established in a disused section of the Explosive storage was in the left hand container,
quarry at Pony Pass
with the APB to the right
Two Iso containers were positioned side-by-side. One was used for the storage of recovered mines and
fuzes (the assemblies being safely separated from one another). The other container was converted for use
as an Ammunition Processing Building (APB).

2
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Storage of recovered mines

The APB was basic but functional

The following sequence of events was then followed (Annex B):
a. External check of condition and photography
b. Assessment of safety to disarm, where applicable
c. Disarming by removal of the detonator
d. Disassembly of mine casing
e. Removal of internal components
f. Examination and photography throughout
g. Reassembly as a training aid, or set aside for destruction.
Explosive testing
The explosive testing of detonators was an important part of the Phase 4A exploitation work. No matter
what the condition of the body, the fuze mechanism or the main charge, a mine is incapable of functioning
as designed if the detonator is not serviceable.
A rig was improvised, in which a heavy steel girder could be lowered onto a mine fuze in order to actuate it.
The firing pin was released onto the detonator and the outcome observed from a safe distance.
P4B fuzes, complete with detonators, were placed between two blocks for actuation. In order to test SB-33
and SB-81 detonators, SB-81 fuze mechanisms were reassembled and detonators attached; the assembly
was then placed in an adapted SB-81 casing. The number of tests that could be conducted this way was
limited because the fuze was destroyed each time a detonator functioned.

The explosive test rig used a rope and pulley to lower A P4B mine fuze placed on the test rig, ready for the
a girder onto the mine fuze
girder to be lowered
3
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OUTLINE OF FINDINGS
P4B
Origin
All mine bodies and fuze assemblies were produced in the same batch, namely 2-5-78 (1978 being the year
of production).
There is no reason to expect any significant inconsistencies among the batch, therefore most of the
differences observed are due to the effects of ageing.
Casing
A significant proportion of the fuze casings had hardened and cracked, with many partially disintegrated.
The proportion of degraded fuzes recovered so far during Phase 4A is substantially greater than on previous
phases.
The primary result of casing degradation is the exposure of the inner fuze cavity, leading to the ingress of
water. This tends to have two significant effects:
a. Corrosion of the striker spring
b. Degradation of the detonator.
In examples where the top of the fuze casing had broken away, the striker spring and spacer were often
missing altogether, leaving the mechanism incomplete. This means that the fuze could no longer function
as designed.
In most instances, the lower section of the mine (containing the main charge) was in good condition.
Detectability
As in previous phases, no detection instrument has been considered reliable enough for use with buried
P4B mines. Even when new, the striker spring (weighing just 0.14 g) is borderline for location using the
current generation of detectors, while the foil covering the main charge is completely non-ferrous and
makes little contribution to the detection signature. This has meant using primarily manual excavation to
locate mines.
Any corrosion of the striker spring reduces its metallic mass and makes it even less detectable.

A range of degradation was present among P4B fuze casings

4

Many springs were corroded
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Although it has little significance for conventional metal detection, the foil2 which covers the explosive
charge in the mine body may be significant for Ground Penetrating Radar (GPR).
GPR is now used in some instruments, combined with conventional metal detection, in order to identify
anomalies in the ground. However, the fingers of broken foil - which are similar in size to the wavelength
of the radar - may resonate to create a distinctive signal. GPR is an increasingly mainstream detection
technique and might suitable for use against this mine type in future.
The foil is installed in the P4B body as a flat disc, but is broken when the fuze is fitted. In most cases, the
foil ruptures in several places, creating ‘fingers’ that protrude into the fuze well. In some examples the foil
remains virtually intact, while in others a portion is absent, but every P4B mine examined (including
previous phases) has had some foil present.

Variations in the foil covering the main charge

View of the foils from the inside of the casing

Detonator functionality
Detonator function tests were performed on a number of fuzes recovered from four separate locations.
Only complete fuzes, in good external condition, were selected for the test.
Of the 50 fuzes tested, only 16 (approximately one third) produced any explosive effect. The majority of
these were recovered from a mine dump, where the packaging provided some measure of protection
against the environment. Test results are shown in the table below:
Location
Number tested
Functioned
Failed

59S
10
5
5

59N
10
0
10

24
10
0
10

Mines dump
20
11
9

Out of those that exploded, the majority produced a weak effect that would probably fail to propagate to
the main charge. In other words, actuation of mines in this category would be unlikely to cause injury.

Results from P4B detonator testing. The fuze
on the left was one of the few that detonated
fully; the one on the right barely had the
energy to break the housing and would not
have detonated the main charge

2

The foil is an alloy of lead, tin and antimony
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SB-33 and SB-81
Origin
The SB-33 (AP) and SB-81 (AT) were both produced by the former Italian manufacturer MISAR. They use
similar designs and materials, and are often laid together in minefields; it therefore makes sense to
consider them together.
The mines bear no significant markings, so it is not possible to confirm their date of manufacture or lot
numbers. However, both types were produced in huge quantities and it is probable that all of the mines
sold to Argentina, and subsequently laid in the Falkland Islands, originated from the same batches.
Casing
Almost all of the casings of the SB-33 and SB-81 mines examined were in excellent condition and showed
little sign of deterioration.
As noted in previous phases, the rubber covers of the SB-33 mines were generally domed where prolonged
exposure to water had caused the material to swell. Despite the rubber remaining intact, it appears that
water eventually permeated, since most mines were moist inside.
Moisture was also present in most of the SB-81 mines, despite the integrity of the rubber pressure plate.
The SB-81 fuze is actuated pneumatically, so the seal and flexibility of this plate are critical to its function;
both aspects appeared to be unaffected in the mines examined3

The rubber domes on the SB-33 mines have swelled The pressure plates (right) of the SB-81 mines were
and allowed some moisture to enter
in good condition; most were wet on the inside
Detectability
The primary detection signatures of the SB-33 and SB-81 come from their striker springs; these are made
from magnetic steel and, when new, have masses of approximately 0.64 g and 0.86 g respectively. Other
metallic components (such as stainless steel firing pins and aluminium detonator capsules) make little
contribution to the signature.
Even where water had entered the mines, rusting of the striker springs was generally light and superficial.
This means that the metal content of both mine types still remains well above the detection threshold.
3

Similar mines in hotter climates often have dry, cracked pressure plates that prevent them from operating.
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Even when rusted, the steel springs had lost little of their original mass (SB-33 left, SB-81 right)
Main charges
Most of the SB-33 and SB-81 explosive charges were in excellent condition; some SB-33 charges and SB-81
boosters were damp, but most were assessed to be fully functional.
Detonator condition
The same type of detonator capsule is used in the SB-33 and SB-81. In both cases, the detonator is
attached to a plug that seals the underside of the mine with a synthetic rubber O-ring. If this plug has not
been tightened sufficiently then water will enter the mine. The front surface of the detonator incorporates
the ‘stab-receptor’, which contains a pyrotechnic composition that is susceptible to damp.
Most detonators appeared to be in good condition; however, some had white crusting (probably
aluminium oxide from the detonator capsule) while others had a brown gelatinous exudation from the stab
receptor.

Detonators from the SB-81 mines, some of which show signs of deterioration
Detonator functionality
Detonators from SB-33 and SB-81 mines were tested by attaching them to a reassembled SB-81 fuze
mechanism, from which the pneumatic actuation system had been removed. This assembly was then
placed in an adapted SB-81 mine body, from which all explosive had been removed.
7
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The limited number of fuzes available meant that only a relatively small number of detonators could be
tested, since the fuze was destroyed if the detonator functioned. The results below have little statistical
significance, but they do indicate that some detonators are fully functional and others are unserviceable,
while some appear to be in a transitional state that results in incomplete detonation.
Mine type
Number tested
Full function
Partial function
Failed

SB-33
4
2
1
1

SB-81
4
2
1
1

The gradual decline of detonators within SB-33 mines was also apparent from mines that had failed to fully
function when actuated. Of the 16 mines examined, 6 had the firing pin embedded in the detonator, which
did not initiate.
The presence of the firing pin in the stab receptor of the detonator is a major and unexpected hazard, since
further movement could cause initiation. During disarming, the detonator is withdrawn from the mine
body at right angles to the firing pin, meaning that the two components scrape together. If the detonator is
still active, this could initiate the mine in the hands of the deminer.

An SB-33 detonator plug removed to reveal the An SB-33 disassembled, showing the pin in the fired
detonator still in position, impaled on the firing pin
position and a hole visible in the detonator
A further 4 mines were recovered with no detonator plugs present. It was initially assumed that these
mines had been laid unarmed, without plugs, but examination showed that all had been actuated.
In each case, the detonator had exploded (ejecting the plug) but with insufficient force to initiate the main
charge. The most likely explanation for this is deterioration of the detonators.

8
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Several SB-33 mines had detonator plugs missing Examination revealed that the detonators had
and were initially assumed to be unarmed
exploded, but failed to initiate the main charges
Additional tasks and deliverables
In addition to the main exploitation task, the following outcomes were achieved:


Once disassembled, examined and tested, a number of mines were rebuilt, free from explosive
(FFE). These are now available as training aids and test pieces for metal detection.



One of each mine type was made into a sectioned model.



The main charges extracted from the SB-81 mines were set aside for use as demolition charges.



During clearance operations, an unknown type of AT mine was discovered. It was thought to have
an inert filling but investigation showed that it contained a charge of TNT. The mine was later
confirmed to be the Argentinian steel-cased copy of the US M1; this type was used in several
minefields.



The difference between the profile of an armed SB-33 and one that had been actuated was
highlighted, and models made to illustrate both states.

Sectioned models were made for each mine type

A number of mines were reassembled, inert (‘FFE’)

9
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SB-81 charge were retained for demolition

A ‘new’ mine type was identified

It is often possible to establish whether or not an
SB-33 has been actuated by carefully feeling the
position of the central plunger (through the
rubber cover)
This inert model was produced - along with an
actuated version – to illustrate the difference.
The plunger is supported by a flexible ring so that
it moves realistically, but cannot be actuated

Conclusions
The exploitation process was conducted successfully and without incident.
The work offered further insight into the condition of P4B, SB-33 and SB-81 mines, confirming that the
samples examined showed more significant signs of deterioration than those seen on previous phases.
Specific conclusions and implications relating to the mines examined are summarised below (negative
points shaded in red and positives in green):
Mine type

Conclusion

So what?

The metal content, which is close to the Conventional metal detection is unlikely to
detection threshold when the mine is new, be reliable, regardless of enhancements to
falls well below as the striker spring rusts
the technology

P4B

Foil has been present in every mine examined Detection using GPR is a possibility
(on this and previous phases)
Taking into account the number badly The risk of injury, should a mine be
deteriorated or unserviceable, combined with actuated accidentally, is relatively low.
those that produced a weak explosive effect,
it is estimated that only 10 - 20% of P4B mines
from these areas are still functional.
10
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SB-33

Out of 16 mines examined, 10 had been This was unexpected and is currently
actuated but failed to detonate
unexplained
It is not unusual for the mine to be found with It is potentially hazardous to defuze the
the firing pin embedded in the detonator
mine in this state

SB-33 and
SB-81

A proportion of detonators are non-functional The risks from remaining mines are
or underpowered
declining
Metal content remains fairly consistent, even Metal detection is likely to remain a
in mines that have deteriorated
reliable option for the foreseeable future

Recommendations
It is recommended that:


Trials are arranged to assess the feasibility of using GPR for the detection of the P4B.



No attempt should be made to defuze SB-33 mines in the field.



SB-33 mines should be recovered, fully fuzed, and demolished within the minefield. A special
demolition procedure should be developed to ensure complete destruction.



Scientific analysis should be conducted to investigate the changes occurring within the mine
detonators, including the causes.



The effects of ageing on recovered mines and other significant ordnance4 continue to be monitored
in future phases.



Further data are needed on the location and circumstances of recovered mines in order to
understand the factors affecting their condition. All contractors and authorities involved in
demining operations should consider ways to collect such data without impeding clearance work.

Colin King
Technical Director
Fenix Insight Ltd
March 2015

4

Such as booby traps and BL-755 cluster munitions
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Annex A – Mine types examined during Phase 4a

Designation:
Type:
Origin:
Weight:
Diameter:
Height:
Explosive weight:
Explosive type:
Operating pressure:

P4B
Anti-personnel
Spain
171 g
72 mm
43 mm
100 g
TNT/PETN
10 kg approx

Designation:
Type:
Origin:
Weight:
Diameter:
Height:
Explosive weight:
Explosive type:
Operating pressure:

SB-33
Anti-personnel
Italy
140 g
85 mm
30 mm
35 g
RDX/HMX
8 kg approx

Designation:
Type:
Origin:
Weight:
Diameter:
Height:
Explosive weight:
Explosive type:
Operating pressure:

SB-81
Anti-tank
Italy
3.3 kg
230 mm
90 mm
2.2 kg
TNT/RDX/HMX
150-310 kg

A-1
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Annex B – Exploitation Process Map

B-1

